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It now appears likely that the invasion of Iraq will prove to be a 
seminal event in the evolution of international security generally. Legal 
order has evidently collapsed throughout the country, and the occupying 
forces have not been able to control the resulting pattern of predatory 
violence. The central reason is that the United States forfeited at the outset 
the critical asset of legitimacy necessary to establish and maintain 
consensual rule, and its continued presence undermines the indigenous 
institutions it is attempting to nurture. Similar breakdowns have occurred in 
other parts of the world, and the consequences have been tolerated over 
extended periods of time. Because of timing, location and the entanglement 
of the United States, however, intractable violence in Iraq can be expected to 
have much stronger global resonance. American forces alone are not likely 
to be able to master the situation but neither can they be withdrawn without 
intensifying internal violence and extending it into an already volatile 
region. The potential consequences of that dilemma are ominous, but for that 
reason the situation presents opportunity as well as danger. Calamity is 
sometimes a catalyst for greater wisdom.  
Within the United States disengagement from Iraq promises to be a 
riveting issue in the forthcoming presidential election, but the formulae 
advanced for accomplishing that are unlikely to be realistic and even less 
likely to be constructive. The American political process is still in the early 
stages of absorbing the magnitude of disaster in Iraq and has not yet 
acknowledged the probable implications. To have any hope of achieving a 
tolerable outcome, an effective stabilization and reconstruction process 
would have to be established and sustained long enough for a viable 
government to form from a shattered social base – at least a decade 
presumably, perhaps even a generation. Responsibility for that effort would 
                                                 
1 Adapted from “Reflections On The Doctrine of Sovereignty, The Process of 
Globalization and the Prospects for Security Transformation” in Shifting Boundaries of 
Sovereignty: Challenges for the 21st Century, Heinrich Böll Foundation of North 




have to be transferred to a broadly representative international consortium 
that might be able to command the consensual cooperation the United States 
itself will never be able to achieve. United States military capability, which 
will remain necessary to prevent external incursion and to limit the scale of 
internal conflict, would have to be subordinated in practical effect to the 
authority of that consortium. Intensely reluctant governments would have to 
be induced to participate in the consortium and would have to be 
compensated for their efforts. Members whose established independence 
gives them the greatest potential for commanding acceptance within Iraq 
would have to be credibly reassured about the use of American military 
power generally. Those implications lie well outside the bounds of political 
acceptability at the moment and will not be prominently discussed during the 
course of the election. Less demanding alternatives have not yet been 
exhausted.   
With the inauguration of a new administration in 2009, however, 
some process of fundamental reconsideration can be expected, whoever the 
incumbent proves to be. Relentless circumstance will eventually impose 
itself on even the most entrenched political attitudes and even the most 
established institutions. Reconsideration will undoubtedly begin with the 
inherited Iraq situation but cannot be confined to that. Global implications 
will have to be addressed. The fundamentals of policy will have to be 
engaged. 
In the broader context of security policy, the Iraq venture has become 
a test for those who have argued for primary reliance on national military 
advantage achieved through adroit application of advanced technology, a 
project they have labeled transformation. Their primary claim has been that 
opposing military forces can be decisively defeated rapidly and at tolerable 
cost by superior combined arms operations, as was demonstrated in the 
initial assaults in Afghanistan and Iraq. The officially stated intention is to 
use superior military capability preemptively both to prevent the acquisition 
of mass destruction weapons by hostile governments and to alter the 
character of those governments before they present imminent threats of any 
sort. The less explicit but widely perceived implication is that transformation 
is to be undertaken exclusively by the United States thereby enabling global 
military dominance. Experience in Iraq has revealed the fallacy of that 
project by vividly demonstrating that security ultimately depends more on 
inducing adherence to consensual rules than on wielding coercive force. The 
process of globalization is changing the scale and character of threat as well 
as the entire context of human interactions and is making collaboration for 
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mutual protection far more important to all the major societies than 
competition for national advantage. That emerging fact is likely to require 
transformation not merely of the means of coercion but also the basic 
purposes and organizing principles of security policy as well as the resulting 
international relationships – a fundamental reconceptualization of vital 
interest.   
Conceptual adjustment of that scope is admittedly difficult to achieve 
and consensus even more difficult. The general implications of specific 
events are never immediately apparent and are generally understood only 
with the advantage of lengthy retrospect. Some of the reasons why 
conceptual transformation is likely to be necessary are nonetheless evident. 
Human societies are obviously organized in separate jurisdictions prone to 
mutual distrust. Virtually all individuals identify with some segment of the 
others and not with the species as a whole. Many of them are actively hostile 
to those they set beyond the boundaries of their identity, and the central 
purpose of security policy has traditionally been to provide preferential 
protection against hostile intrusion. The process of globalization runs across 
all national jurisdictions, however, and transcends the control of any of 
them. It also appears to be imposing common interests at least potentially 
more significant than divisive ones to which security policy has traditionally 
been directed. All human societies face the increasingly demanding problem 
of acting effectively on behalf of common interest beyond the bounds of 
their primary emotional and legal affiliations, a process that pits 
circumstance against sentiment.  
 
The Pressure of Circumstance 
The defining feature of the apparent globalization process is a 
spontaneously occurring increase in the scope, range and intensity of human 
interactions. If it is indeed occurring as now commonly imagined and if we 
were able to measure it with complete precision, we would presumably 
observe that commodities, money, and information have all been flowing in 
recent years over greater distances at increasing volume with increasing 
velocity; that these transactions have involved an increasing proportion of 
the world’s population; and that they have affected the social attitudes on 
which national jurisdiction is based. Some part of those expectations we can 
in fact observe – exponential increases in international financial transactions, 
for example, and more linear increases in commodity trade. Other aspects 
are considerably more obscure, but most of those who study the matter 
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nonetheless believe that economic activity in particular is spontaneously 
globalizing and is thereby escaping the effective control of any national 
government.  
It is also fairly evident that the pattern of growth associated with the 
globalizing economy is highly inequitable: gains in standards of living have 
been heavily concentrated among affluent; population increases are 
occurring almost exclusively among the poor. The empirical relationship 
between equity and legitimacy is not well understood, nor is the empirical 
connection between economic equity and civil violence. It is prudent to 
assume, however, that these relationships are important even though they are 
not well measured. The process of globalization poses a threat to national 
governments not only because it escapes segmented jurisdiction but also 
because it appears to be undermining social consensus on which political 
legitimacy and social coherence depend.  
Moreover, whether or not it is considered a defining characteristic, the 
term globalization also refers to the increasingly evident fact that aggregate 
human activity is beginning to affect basic features of the earth’s ecology, 
most notably the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases on which 
all forms of life depend. Without the warming effect of those gases – the 
absorption and re-radiation of solar energy – the earth would be too cold to 
support organic life, but as with several other features of the physical 
universe the benign, enabling effect is confined to a narrow band of 
variation. Increases in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gasses 
projected to occur as a result of human activity – especially energy 
generation – are in principle capable of altering global weather patterns to an 
extent that might affect the viability of many if not all contemporary 
societies. At the moment effects of that sort can be credibly outlined, but 
their exact character, probability, timing and magnitude cannot be specified 
with scientific precision. If ever they can be specified to exacting scientific 
standards, the momentum of the effects in question is likely to make them 
irreversible as a practical matter. That probable fact imposes problems of 
prudent judgment and internationally coordinated action far beyond what 
any national entities have historically encountered.  
 
Selected Security Implications 
Prevailing security policy is based on principles of active 
confrontation forged primarily during the Cold War. And despite the 
rhetorical accommodation that has occurred in the aftermath of that 
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historical period, legacy policies have not been fundamentally altered. The 
countervailing deterrent operations of American and Russian nuclear forces 
still dominate international security arrangements in operational reality if not 
in public consciousness. Although there have been largely declaratory 
reductions in the inventories of those forces, they are essentially as lethal as 
they ever have been and as actively deployed. Both countries continuously 
maintain several thousand nuclear weapons on alert status, and they are 
programmed to initiate massive bombardment within minutes and to 
complete it within hours. As an objective matter that situation presents what 
is by far the greatest physical danger to both of the societies in question and 
to all others as well. According to the doctrine of deterrence, the threat 
provides decisive protection against deliberate assault, but it also creates the 
possibility of a catastrophic accident – an inconvenient fact the significance 
of which that is heavily discounted by disciples of the doctrine.   
With regard to conventional forces, the active confrontation 
associated with the Cold War period has disappeared, leaving United States 
forces embedded in their alliance arrangements with dominance over any 
operation large enough to contest sovereign control over national territory. 
The traditional principle of confrontation remains in the sense that United 
States forces pose an implicit threat to any country not formally allied, are 
not credibly balanced by any independent force and are not reliably 
restrained by any formal agreement. That situation presents an inherent 
security problem to all countries outside of the United States alliance 
system. Most of those countries plausibly judge that cross border aggression 
is not likely to occur on the scale experienced during the last century, in 
significant part because any such exercise would threaten economic 
performance – the dominant imperative of the globalization era. Nonetheless 
some do have reason to worry.  
Within the United States and to a lesser extent within its alliance 
system, public concern for these traditional forms of threat – massive 
nuclear bombardment and cross border aggression – has been almost entirely 
replaced by fear of terrorism inspired by the events of September 2001.  
That shift of focus has been less dramatic for the rest of the world, but 
nonetheless it is becoming generally apparent that smaller scale more 
broadly dispersed forms of violence are destined to be an increasing priority 
of security policy. Most of the violence actually encountered, in Iraq and 
elsewhere, arises from unresolved problems of civil conflict, and most of the 
terrorism that has occurred has been embedded in one or more of those 
conflicts. It is now recognized that the evident inability to resolve or even 
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effectively mitigate the more serious instances of chronic civil conflict is 
generating a threat to global order that could be increasingly serious even if 
the conflicts themselves remain contained within their host societies. That 
threat could become truly compelling if the extreme antagonism generated in 
unresolved conflicts becomes operationally connected to instruments of 
mass destruction. Mercifully that has not yet occurred, despite rampant 
speculation, but the barriers that are in principle possible have not been 
constructed, have not yet even been designed. Meanwhile the phenomenon 
of global warming – a source of threat of yet larger scale and yet more 
radically different character than the traditional concerns – has barely been 
acknowledged as a looming security problem.  
It is, of course, virtually impossible to determine with any confidence 
how these fundamental changes in the scale and character of primary 
security threat might play out over an extended period of time. There are 
many outcomes that can plausibly be imagined, and experience accumulated 
under different conditions is a questionable guide to prediction.  As Søren 
Kierkegaard once noted, life is understood backwards but lived forward. 
There are nonetheless some common sense suggestions as to how it ought to 
play out. Aspirations are easier to formulate than predictions.   
Security policy responsive to the emerging circumstances of 
globalization would make the defense of global legal order its primary 
objective and would therefore elevate common interest over national 
advantage. The reason is simply that the coordination required to operate a 
global economy across divided jurisdictions can only be achieved by 
equitable legal principles that can command sufficiently broad allegiance to 
make enforcement possible. In such an arrangement all forms confrontation 
would be subordinated to direct collaboration, and the practice of deterrence 
in particular would be subordinated to reassurance, which has always been 
in fact a companion principle. Active monitoring would become the 
principle method of protection. That involves the organized exchange of 
information to set and enforce basic standards of behavior – a technique that 
can be extremely powerful if appropriately applied, in part because it would 
provide the legitimizing context for any use of force. Security relationships 
in such an arrangement would generally be inclusive rather than divisive, 
and legacy policies of confrontation among the United States, Russia, China 
and India in particular would have to be transformed.  Territorial sovereignty 
would remain, but its protection would primarily be a common enterprise.  
Those who can only think of what history has so far revealed will 
undoubtedly find that image of general security transformation to be 
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implausible. Those with some sense of what globalization means are likely 
to find it more interesting. Wherever on the spectrum of receptiveness one 
might fall, however, most would concede that any transformation of security 
policy which does occur is not likely to be an exercise of general design and 
is more likely to be the emergent result of reactions to specific problems. Of 
the many broad issues that might play a catalytic role in an evolutionary 
process of transformation, four are especially significant: the management of 
nuclear explosive materials, the oversight of biotechnology, the regulation of 
space activities and the mitigation of global warming. These can and will be 
seen as separate issues, but there are significant connections between them.  
 
Nuclear explosives 
The term nuclear explosive materials refers to any combination of 
radioactive isotopes that can generate an explosive chain reaction. There are 
nine principal isotopes which have this characteristic, of which U 235 and 
Pu 239 have been the most extensively produced and applied. Of all human 
produced commodities these two explosive isotopes have been the most 
assertively and exclusively subjected to national jurisdiction. They are 
managed by separate national accounting and physical security systems that 
are largely opaque to each other. As a result the United States government’s 
estimate of the total number of nuclear weapons in existence has an 
uncertainty range of 5000, and the estimate for total explosive materials is 
even more uncertain. Nonetheless each single weapon and each amount of 
material equivalent to a weapon ( 48 kg of U 235 and 10 kg of Pu239 for the 
bare sphere critical masses) is of strategic significance given the devastation 
that can be caused in an urban area. During the Cold War period when the 
deterrent effect was embodied in upwards of 10,000 weapons in each of the 
two principal opposing arsenals, uncertainty about a single weapon appeared 
to be insignificant. If it is admitted that a dedicated terrorist might attempt to 
gain access to a nuclear weapon or an equivalent amount of explosive 
material, then managerial control over every single unit becomes a matter of 
high priority. Current national accounting and physical security systems 
cannot assure control of every single unit, particularly not the internally 
burdened system that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union.  
Given inherent uncertainties about historical production of the 
explosive nuclear isotopes, it would take decades for an advanced 
accounting and physical security system to approach the standard of single 
unit accuracy, and many specialists believe that standard could never be 
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achieved. It is apparent, however, that much higher standards than now 
prevail could be achieved if managerial control were given priority over the 
active display of deterrent capability. The fact that that shift of priority has 
not occurred with the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization is 
a massive scandal waiting to happen – an indictment of legacy policies. It is 
technically feasible to devise a common accounting and physical security 
system for all nuclear weapons and materials that over time would approach 
the standard of assuring single unit control while reliably preserving 
exclusive national jurisdiction over the details of weapons design and 
location. It is a reasonable expectation that political demand for such an 
arrangement driven by the fear of terrorism will eventually be insistent. It is 
also a reasonable presumption that achieving such an arrangement will 
require the termination of active nuclear force operations. That is itself a 
dramatic improvement in safety that can be achieved with little if any 
reduction in the underlying deterrent effect.  
 
Biotechnology 
The second of the candidate catalytic issues – protective oversight of 
biotechnology – is comparable and potentially even greater in the magnitude 
of danger posed but fundamentally different in most other respects. The 
central driving fact is that the fundamental science of molecular biology has 
progressed to the point that extremely consequential interventions in basic 
life process have become feasible. Depending on how it is utilized the same 
basic knowledge can enable powerful therapies or devastating destruction, 
with the latter unfortunately being generally easier than the former. That 
promises the eradication of historical diseases. It also threatens the creation 
of diseases substantially more destructive than those that have naturally 
evolved. That possibility, which was generally doubted a decade ago, is now 
widely acknowledged. The inherent power of molecular biology has given 
human society as a whole an enormous stake in how it is applied and that 
transcendent interest almost certainly means that independent oversight 
procedures will have to be devised for the fundamental research process 
itself. Independent oversight is applied to virtually all matters of high social 
consequence. No one is allowed to manage large sums of money without 
audit. No single individual is ever allowed exclusive control over a nuclear 
weapon. It seems inevitable that robust oversight procedures will eventually 
have to be developed for those areas of biological research that pose large 
inherent danger.  
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The significant feature of that fact is that oversight procedures would 
have to be globally applied in order to be effective and that means that they 
would have to be globally devised. The research process in question is 
globally distributed in the biomedical research community, and it has 
achieved a degree of momentum that obviously exceeds the ability of any 
sovereign entity or limited collation to exercise control. Biomedical research 
cannot be isolated from normal daily life to the extent that the production of 
explosive nuclear isotopes can be and have been. Since there is no serious 
prospect of being able to exercise exclusive national control over the 
biomedical research process, inclusive international collaboration is the only 
realistic option. When the implications are absorbed, as they will eventually 
have to be, devising oversight procedures for purposes of mutual protection 
will be a very powerful incentive for security collaboration. As is already 
widely remarked and in fact immediately exaggerated, a nihilistic terrorist 
dedicated to mass destruction would logically choose an advanced biological 
pathogen as the agent of choice. The barriers to access are substantial but 
nothing like what they are for nuclear weapons and explosive nuclear 
isotopes. They will have to be made more significant. 
 
Space activities  
At the moment assets in space do not directly threaten mass 
destruction on earth. The deployment of weapons that would has been 
successfully prohibited by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and that rule has not 
recently been contested. Space assets do contribute very substantially, 
however, to the emerging capability to undertake sudden precision attack at 
very long range. That capability was dramatically displayed by the United 
States in November of 2003 when an unmanned Predator aircraft destroyed a 
car traveling in the desert in Yemen that was said to be carrying a leading 
terrorist figure. Although the details of the operation were not revealed, it is 
apparent that the aircraft was controlled remotely and probable that the 
controllers were using communications relay and navigation services from 
space assets. At any rate those services as well as direct observation can in 
principle be used for operations of that sort, which from the perspective of 
sovereign jurisdiction might generally be labeled coercive intrusion. . In that 
instance the summary execution of an alleged terrorist outside sovereign 
jurisdiction without trial or any other documented form of deliberative 
process was not prominently contested, but repeated exercises of that sort 
would certainly be contested, especially by the United States if anyone else 
did them. If the capacity for that type of operation develops as expected and 
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if many countries acquire it, as should be prudently assumed, there will 
assuredly be insistent demands for legal regulation and those demands will 
predictably focus on the utilization of space assets. Those assets may not be 
necessary for all forms of coercive intrusion, but in principle they provide 
greater reach and greater menace. Given the inherent vulnerability of space 
assets, they also provide a natural target for retribution.  
In recent years the United States has been officially articulating an 
extremely provocative doctrine of space development, asserting the intention 
to dominate the military use of space for decisive national advantage and to 
deny comparable capability to any other country. It has rejected efforts by 
virtually the entire international community to initiate negotiations on rules 
that would prevent the introduction of conventionally armed weapons in 
space, making it apparent if a step short of explicit that it intends itself to 
introduce such weapons. Although the declared aspiration for dominance is 
not realistic either in technical or in economic terms, the scope for advanced 
forms of coercive intrusion is appreciable, and it is predictable that concern 
about operations of that sort will eventually generate insistent international 
demands for legal regulation. Since protective regulation is in the real 
interest of the United States itself, one can also plausibly suppose that formal 
negotiations on the subject will eventually occur and will provide an 
occasion for working out more advanced principles of security collaboration. 
 
Global warming 
 Over the course of the past decade, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) has forged consensus within the scientific 
community on basic features of the global warming problem. They have 
determined that the concentration in the earth’s atmosphere of those carbon 
gas molecules that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation has been increasing 
as a result of aggregate human activity since the industrial revolution and 
that the average surface temperature of the earth has increased by 0.4 to 0.8 
oC over the past century as a result. They estimate that an additional increase 
of 1.5 to 6 oC  would occur if the current pattern of carbon gas emission 
were to be continued for an additional century. They note that these 
temperature changes are very large and very rapid in comparison to the 
geological record and are in principle capable of triggering fundamental 
changes in the earth’s climate pattern. Again, current scientific knowledge is 
not sufficient to establish with confidence the exact character, magnitude, 
timing, probability or consequence of those changes, but is sufficient to warn 
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of that they might be catastrophic for human societies. By the time a 
catastrophic threat could be identified with precision and confidence, 
moreover, the process generating it is likely to be irreversible on any time 
scale of human interest.  
 It is technically feasible to mitigate the inherent danger by changing 
the prevailing pattern of energy generation and consumption, but that would 
require a global policy initiative of unprecedented scope and consequence. 
In addition to introducing incentives for greater efficiency, those 
technologies capable of providing energy in the amount required to support 
equitable economic development would have to developed to the level of 
market viability, and the current trajectory of global energy markets would 
have to be assertively deflected to induce their adoption. Since the increase 
in carbon gas concentrations would have to be halted by 2050 at a level of 
500 ppm or below to achieve a prudent standard of protection, there are only 
five basic technologies that could plausibly provide carbon free energy in 
amounts sufficient to meet rising global demand: wind, solar, biomass, 
carbon sequestration and nuclear fission. All will presumably have to have 
to be developed and applied to some extent, although the long term viability 
of the naturally favored option, carbon sequestration, has yet to be 
demonstrated and might not be able to meet the burden of proof that should 
be imposed.  
 The significance for security policy rests primarily on the degree to 
which the response to global warming depends on nuclear power generation. 
Global energy requirements might in principle be achieved by the some 
combination of the other methods, but that cannot be assumed at the outset. 
A dramatic expansion of nuclear power will certainly have to be seriously 
considered and probably undertaken. That in turn would require radical 
revision of current reactor designs, fuel cycle management practices and 
fundamental security relationships. It would be unsustainably dangerous to 
expand nuclear power generation using current reactor designs with 
nationally controlled fuel cycle management in the context of prevailing 
deterrent practices and confrontational security relationships. The incentive 
and opportunity for hostile diversion of nuclear explosive isotopes could not 
and would not be tolerated. The safe expansion of nuclear power generation 
in response to global warming would require intimate collaboration among 
China, the EU, India, Japan, Russia and the United States as a priority matter 
and that requirement can be expected eventually to reach the top of all the 
governments concerned. When all the technical and institutional 
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implications are absorbed, strong impulse will be given to the conceptual 
transformation of security policy.  
 
Immediate Context 
 If the Iraq situation does indeed provide the catalyst for that general 
transformation, at least within the United States, then dealing with Iran’s 
nuclear materials production efforts is likely to be the focus of one of its 
important initial stages. Iran is entangled in the internal violence in Iraq and 
simultaneously presents the most immediately troublesome threat of nuclear 
weapons proliferation. It is currently defying a United Nations resolution 
demanding that it suspend its efforts to enrich uranium and produce 
plutonium, thereby providing potential justification for an attack on the 
facilities in question before they are able to produce a sufficient amount of 
material to fabricate nuclear weapons. United States forces could carry out 
such an attack without undertaking the burden of a ground invasion, and 
highly inflammatory political statements by the Iranian President appear to 
invite it. The lessons emerging from Iraq clearly suggest, however, that such 
a development would be a disaster for all concerned. It would retard but not 
destroy the Iranian program and would presumably provoke an extended 
process of terrorist retaliation. Again, credible danger provides a strong 
incentive for devising constructive alternatives.  
 The formula for a constructive alternative is readily apparent. It would 
involve an agreement by Iran not to engage in uranium enrichment or 
plutonium production on sufficient scale to enable fabrication of nuclear 
weapons and to document its compliance with those restrictions by 
accepting IAEA monitoring under the Advanced Protocol rules. In exchange 
Iran would receive security assurances from the United States, ratified by the  
International community generally, that it would not be attacked if it did not 
itself initiate attack. Compliance with those assurances would be 
documented in some manner roughly comparable to Iranian documentation 
of the materials production restrictions. Iran would also receive assurances 
of access to fuel cycle services for nuclear power generation at equitable 
market rates without political conditions. That is the basic formula being 
applied in the North Korean situation. It is an arrangement that Iran could 
not reasonably refuse if it was credibly offered accompanied by a 
commitment to normalization of political and economic relations.  
The extensive substantive discussion and associated adjustment of 
prevailing political attitudes required to apply that formula to Iran would 
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support the broader program of conceptual transformation not only by 
mitigating emotional resistance but also by demonstrating the significance of 
the principles involved. In requiring both Iran and the United States to 
accept standards of behavior and to document their compliance through the 
systematic exchange of information, such an arrangement would illustrate 
the practice of systematic reassurance. In a world of intense antagonisms and 
dispersed threats where small operations can have catastrophic 
consequences, all major states are likely to discover the value and 
consequence of systematic reassurance. That principle supported by 
advanced information technology can be expected to emerge as the 
necessary foundation for international security under the circumstances of 
globalization.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
